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Young children are commonly perceived as highly optimistic and confident, and 
therefore seldom arouse concern as to how they are impacted by academic failure. 
However, there is evidence to suggest that young children can indeed be negatively 
affected by failure experiences. Implicit theories of intelligence can provide individuals 
with a framework by which to perceive failure, though little is known about when these 
theories begin to develop. The current study explores whether children as young as three 
and a half to four years of age demonstrate patterns indicative of incremental or entity 
theories of intelligence as a response to challenge following failure.  
Children worked on a series of puzzles, some of which were impossible to solve. 
Children then chose puzzles to do again and provided reasons for their choices. 
Procedures were adapted from Smiley and Dweck (1994), with an added feedback 
condition of effort or ability. Descriptive comparisons confirmed the hypotheses that 
children would differ in their approach to challenge following failure; children who chose 
to approach challenge more often chose insoluble puzzles and those who avoided 
challenge more often chose soluble puzzles. In addition, challenge approach children 
expressed less performance concern, negative self-evaluation, and disengagement than 
children who avoided challenge. Finally, children who received ability related feedback 
 more often chose soluble puzzles than those who received effort feedback. This study 
suggests that even at three and half years old, children react differently to achievement 
related information. It is possible that at this time, children are in the process of 
developing implicit theories of intelligence that could direct their future cognitions, 
affect, and behavior in the classroom. 
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CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
 Failure is an incredibly complex experience. It is a particularly powerful 
experience in the classroom, where it can dictate the way children approach challenge 
and view themselves as learners (e.g., Diener & Dweck, 1978). In some classrooms, 
failure is perceived as this simple notion of “wrongness”, modeled as a negative 
experience and emphasizing lack of ability. If failure is continuously interpreted in this 
way, struggling learners may eventually disengage completely, believing that they are 
incapable of what it takes to be a student (Hatt, 2012). School can then become an 
uncomfortable, self-conscious and debilitating place to be. Who would want to face that 
kind of environment every day, let alone attempt to learn in it? Moreover, the way 
children perceive and react to failure can be critical for their academic success and 
psychological well-being.  
There are a multitude of potential sources of information that children might 
access in order to interpret failure, such as teachers, parents, or simply past experience.  
One potential source for interpreting failure is implicit theories of intelligence, which 
refer to beliefs regarding the malleability of intellectual ability. Individuals may hold a 
fixed, entity theory or a more malleable, incremental theory of intelligence (Dweck & 
Leggett, 1988). These theories can provide a framework through which individuals 
interpret achievement information across domains and tasks. That is, one’s implicit 
beliefs about intelligence can guide perceptions of and reactions to failure throughout 
one’s entire educational experience.  
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By the late elementary years, children already display patterns reflective of an 
entity theory of intelligence, such as a focus on performance and perception of ability as 
fixed (Dweck, 2002). As a result, considerable research has investigated the negative 
effects of a performance or ability focus by targeting older students (Blackwell, 2007; 
Bong, Cho, & Ahen, 2012; Gniewosz, 2011; Grant & Dweck, 2002; Linnenbrink, 2005; 
Pomerantz & Saxon, 2001). The current study takes a different approach, reasoning that 
if children already react differently to achievement situations in elementary school, 
perhaps interventions should be implemented before maladaptive beliefs develop and 
become embedded in children’s perspective.  
To date, it is unclear exactly when implicit theories of intelligence begin to 
develop. Many studies have been conducted with young children in relation to implicit 
beliefs (Bempechat, Perry, & Dweck, 1991; Benenson & Dweck, 1986; Heyman & 
Compton, 2006; Heyman, Gee, & Giles, 2003; Kurtz-Costes, McCall, & Kinlaw, 2005; 
Stipek & Daniels, 1988;), however fewer studies have investigated children in early 
childhood (Burhans & Dweck, 1995; Hicks, Liu, & Heyman, 2015; Rhodes & Brickman, 
2008; Stipek, 1990), and these studies seldom focus specifically on the development of 
implicit theories.  
The current study seeks to expand on the current literature by investigating 
whether children in early childhood exhibit any indication of holding implicit beliefs 
about intelligence. In doing so, this study can add to the current literature by contributing 
a fuller understanding of when and how children develop beliefs about intelligence. 
Through this understanding, intervention work can be more efficiently targeted in order 
to increase struggling learners success in the classroom. 
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Implicit Theories of Intelligence 
The primary theoretical framework for the current study derives from work done 
by Dweck and colleagues (Dweck, 1986; Dweck, 2002; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Yeager 
& Dweck, 2012) regarding implicit theories of intelligence. In general, implicit theories 
refer to fundamental beliefs or assumptions that an individual holds about personal 
qualities. Implicit theories are characterized as implicit due to the fact that they are 
seldom communicated or demonstrated explicitly. Rather, implicit theories provide an 
underlying framework that direct an individual’s perceptions of a personal attribute. For 
the purposes of this study, implicit theories are discussed specifically in reference to 
intelligence. Implicit theories of intelligence refer to beliefs regarding the malleability of 
intellectual ability. Individuals may hold a fixed, entity theory or a more malleable, 
incremental theory of intelligence. Those who adopt an entity theory tend to view 
intellectual ability as something that is unchangeable and possessed in a fixed amount. In 
contrast, incremental theorists see intellectual ability as something that can develop over 
time.  
It is necessary to note that although achievement goals are not a focus of the 
current study and are therefore not discussed, they are an integral piece of Dweck and 
Leggett’s (1988) theoretical framework, in which implicit theories are thought to predict 
achievement goals (learning or performance), which in turn lead to achievement related 
outcomes. That is, the beliefs that children hold regarding intelligence can guide the goals 
they pursue in the classroom, which in turn can guide their cognitions, affect, and 
behavior in the classroom. Given that achievement goals have not yet been shown to 
operate as a direct link between implicit theories of intelligence and achievement 
outcomes, the present study aims to identify a systematic pattern between the implicit 
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theories of young learners and their achievement related cognitions, affect, and behavior 
in the context of failure.  
Of particular importance for the present study is how implicit theories of 
intelligence can shape the way children view and react to failure experiences. Specifically 
of interest is how having an entity theory of intelligence can lead to maladaptive patterns 
indicative of a “helpless” response. The notion of a helpless response derives from the 
concept of learned helplessness, originally demonstrated in experimental studies with 
animals (Seligman & Maier, 1967). These authors defined learned helplessness as the 
perception of independence between a response and the presentation or withdrawal of a 
stimulus. Dweck and Reppucci (1973) proposed a connection between this phenomenon 
and children who give up in the face of failure, in which the child perceives what they do 
and what happens to them to be independent. Moreover, the child views the situation as 
largely out of his or her control. This notion of uncontrollability is also seen within the 
belief system of an entity theorist, who views intellectual ability as fixed and therefore 
outside of one’s control. 
Dweck and Reppucci (1973) confirmed this hypothesized relationship between 
learned helplessness and children’s response to failure by experimentally inducing 
consistent, non-contingent failure situations with a sample of fifth grade students. They 
found that the children whose performance deteriorated most took less responsibility for 
the outcomes of their actions and attributed failure to absence of ability. In contrast, the 
children who persisted in the face of failure placed more emphasis on the role of effort in 
explaining outcomes of their behavior. These children were characterized as producing a 
“mastery response”. Thus, the children who took less responsibility for their actions 
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could hold the belief that their behavior does not have an effect on their ultimate 
performance and therefore their failure is a result of low ability. Moreover, they could be 
operating from an implicit entity theory of intelligence. On the other hand, children who 
more often made effort attributions appeared to believe that their ability can change, 
perhaps reflecting an underlying incremental theory of intelligence. 
Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin, and Wan (1999) found similar results in an examination 
of implicit beliefs in relation to college students’ effort and ability attributions. Indeed, in 
the face of failure, entity theorists were less likely than incremental theorists to make 
effort attributions regardless of confidence level. In addition, incremental theorists were 
more likely than entity theorists to take remedial action (engage in a tutorial exercise to 
enhance learning and performance) in the face of failure. This finding is echoed by Grant 
and Dweck (2003), who found that goals related to learning are particularly effective over 
performance goals in the face of difficulty. Moreover, some motivational beliefs might 
not have a significant effect on students until challenge is present. 
Similar findings have also been found with younger children. Cain and Dweck 
(1995) interviewed first, third, and fifth graders regarding achievement situations. Results 
indicated that first graders who demonstrated a helpless pattern were more likely than 
their classmates to focus on a final evaluation of a product rather than controllable 
processes such as their effort or classroom conduct. In addition, helpless children at each 
grade produced responses consistent with previous research on learned helplessness such 
as avoiding failure and displaying negative affect during failure. Ziegert, Kistner, Castro, 
and Robertson (2001) produced similar findings with even younger children using 
methodology developed by Dweck and colleagues (e.g., Cain & Dweck, 1995; Smiley & 
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Dweck, 1994). They found not only that kindergarteners displayed helpless behavior, but 
also that these responses to challenge predicted their response to challenge five years 
later. Specifically, helplessness in kindergarten predicted lower expectancies for success 
following failure on a block task and less persistence on a challenging puzzle task. 
In addition to the impact of implicit theories of intelligence on behavioral 
outcomes, research further suggests that the way in which students approach and respond 
to failure can impact their academic achievement (Blackwell et al., 2007; Sternberg, 
2014). Blackwell and colleagues explored the role of implicit theories of intelligence in 
adolescents’ mathematics achievement in a longitudinal intervention study. Specifically, 
implicit theories were measured at the outset of junior high and achievement outcomes 
were then assessed as students progressed through seventh and eighth grade. In the 
authors’ second study, the authors implemented an intervention which involved teaching 
an incremental theory to half the sample.  
After measuring classroom motivation and achievement outcomes of the 
treatment versus control group, the authors found support for the relationship between 
behavioral patterns and implicit theories as well as the predictive power of implicit 
theories over time. Indeed, children with incremental views were found to hold more 
positive beliefs about effort, make less helpless attributions, and utilize more strategies in 
response to failure compared to entity theorists. Further, across two years of junior high 
school, students who endorsed an incremental theory increased their math grades beyond 
those who endorsed an entity theory. 
Implicit theories of intelligence can also impact students psychologically through 
their cognitions and behavior (Burhans & Dweck, 1995; Kamins & Dweck, 1999; 
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Kistner, Ziegert, Castro, Robertson, 2001). In 1999, Kamins and Dweck conducted a 
study examining the negative effects of helplessness in relation to different forms of 
praise. The types of praise discussed relate closely to the beliefs within entity and 
incremental theories of intelligence. Process or effort praise refers to praise that provides 
specific feedback related to the process or task at hand (e.g., you did a great job drawing 
that horse), whereas person or ability praise provides global feedback related to the whole 
person (e.g., you’re so good at drawing). Process praise is related to the incremental 
theory through the joint emphasis on effort and growth, whereas person praise relates to 
the entity theory through a shared emphasis on ability and overall performance.  
Kamins and Dweck (1999) proposed that, depending on the type of feedback 
provided, children could be taught that their competence or worth is determined by their 
performance. This hypothesis was confirmed; children who received person feedback 
gave lower ratings of their product and self, and also showed less persistence compared 
to those who received process feedback. Moreover, person feedback fostered a sense of 
contingent self-worth and helpless responses in the face of failure.  
For example, in their 2001 study, Kistner and colleagues investigated helplessness 
as a precursor for depression and negative self worth. In kindergarten, children’s self-
competence perceptions were assessed and a series of puzzle tasks (see Cain & Dweck, 
1995; Smiley & Dweck, 1994) were administered. Helplessness composite scores were 
computed based on children’s reactions to failure during these puzzle tasks. In fifth 
grade, the same children’s self-competence, self-worth, and depressive symptoms were 
assessed. Results indicated that helplessness in kindergarten was associated with 
increased risk for depressive symptoms and negative self worth five years later. 
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Taken together, these studies trace a link from children’s implicit theories of 
intelligence to their patterns of mastery and helpless behavior, which can have significant 
impacts on children’s self-perceptions and academic achievement. The relationship 
between perceptions of failure, self-perceptions, and academic achievement could be 
especially relevant for young children. Indeed, with an achievement gap already present 
in pre-kindergarten (Wang, 2008), understanding how to help struggling learners is vital 
for researchers, educators, and families alike. If children can begin to develop beliefs that 
are consistent with the more adaptive incremental theory of intelligence before they enter 
formal schooling, they may be more likely to succeed in school and have increased self-
competence perceptions throughout their education. For these reasons, the present study 
seeks to identify whether patterns consistent with previous findings on implicit theories 
and cognitive-affective-behavioral patterns can be found in an early childhood sample. 
Attribution Theory 
Implicit theories of intelligence guide the way students explain and interpret 
academic outcomes. That is, depending on an individual’s view of intelligence, he or she 
attributes outcomes to different causes, which in turn guides his or her response to a 
situation. According to the intrapersonal attribution theory of motivation (Weiner, 1970, 
2005), the motivational process begins with the academic outcome and is then followed 
by an affective reaction (positive or negative). Subsequently, an individual explores why 
the outcome occurred. This exploratory phase more often occurs when an individual is 
faced with a negative, unexpected outcome. The answer to this “why” question 
constitutes a causal attribution and is the intersection of attribution theory and 
achievement motivation. 
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 Locus, stability, and controllability are characterized in attribution theory as 
underlying properties of the cause to which individuals attribute an outcome. These 
properties are important for understanding the joint impact of achievement motivation 
(implicit theories) and attribution theory. Locus refers to the location of the cause, 
stability describes the duration, and controllability refers to whether the cause is 
controllable or uncontrollable. These core characteristics not only qualify the cause 
selected, but also have subsequent behavioral and psychological effects. For instance, 
locus influences feelings of pride in accomplishment and self-esteem. In conjunction with 
locus, controllability influences whether guilt or shame is experienced following 
nonattainment of a goal.  
The beliefs associated with entity and incremental theories of intelligence relate 
especially closely to these underlying causal dimensions. For entity theorists, the 
controllability of a cause is more likely to be perceived as uncontrollable (e.g., math 
ability) whereas incremental theorists more likely perceive the attributed cause as under 
their control. Perceptions of stability and locus could be similar for both entity and 
incremental theorists. For example, luck is perceived as external and uncontrollable and 
effort is perceived as internal and controllable from the perspective of both theories. The 
critical impact of implicit theories enters here, where the beliefs that a student holds can 
direct the causal ascription selected. Indeed, if a cause is qualified to have an internal 
locus, this is not necessarily detrimental. However, a student will experience the situation 
very differently depending on if that internal cause is attributed to low ability (entity 
theory) or low effort (incremental theory). In this way, attribution theory is intimately 
related to the consequences of adopting an entity or incremental view. 
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Many researchers have conducted studies connecting achievement situations with 
attribution theory (Dweck, 1975; Hanusa & Schulz, 1977; Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin, & 
Wan, 1999; Weiner, 2010). Hong and colleagues specifically aimed to integrate 
attribution theory with Dweck & Leggett’s (1988) model of implicit theories of 
intelligence. The authors hypothesized that entity theorists would create ability 
attributions and incremental theorists would create effort attributions, which would then 
facilitate mastery-oriented coping. Results supported the researchers’ hypothesis, and 
even showed that the confidence level of entity theorists did not appear significant for 
their attribution patterns. That is, high confidence entity theorists were no more likely 
than low confidence ones to attribute failure to effort. 
Attribution theory also offers great potential for future interventions through 
attribution retraining programs (Chodkiewicz & Boyle, 2014; Dweck, 1975; Forsterling, 
1985; Heller & Ziegler, 2000; Horner & Gaither, 2004; Marsh, Craven, & Debus, 1991). 
Indeed, research has demonstrated that student learning can be improved through 
cognitive interventions that do not focus on any one task or skill (Koles & Boyle, 2013; 
Toland & Boyle, 2008). Such interventions are critical as a realistic option for younger 
children, as demonstrated by Dweck (1975) and Horner and Gaither (2004) with second 
graders. Based on this research, a cognitive motivational intervention fusing attribution 
theory and implicit theories of intelligence could provide critical adaptive foundations for 
young learners. 
Developmental Considerations 
Note that the research studies outlined in this section are exclusively related to 
very young children (kindergarten and below) due to the primary focus and sample of the 
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current study. There is a multitude of additional research that demonstrates how older 
elementary children are impacted by achievement situations (Bong, Cho, Ahn, & Kim, 
2012; Denissen, 2007; Kasanen, Raty, & Eklund, 2009; Simpson, Licht, Wagner, & 
Stader, 1996; Viljaranta, Tolvanen, Aunola, & Nurmi, 2014;).   
Many studies examining implicit theories of intelligence have been conducted 
with upper elementary, secondary, and college students, with a much smaller number 
conducting such research with children in early childhood. This trend is not surprising 
given the common notion that young children lack an ability to realistically produce self-
evaluations or interpret concepts such as ability, effort, or intelligence (Nicholls, 1990; 
Nicholls & Miller, 1984). Nicholls (1990; Nicholls & Miller, 1984) frames ability as a 
broad concept that extends beyond the notion of academic intelligence across domains of 
accomplishment.  
In his research with young children, Nicholls (1990) found that although young 
children can make social comparisons, they do not have normative conceptions of 
difficulty and ability. In addition, children could not differentiate between ability and 
effort until about age ten. Rather, he found that children begin with the perception that 
effort is ability (e.g., people who try harder are smarter despite their performance, and 
people who score higher work harder regardless of actual effort expenditure) and then 
gradually differentiate between the two until they perceive ability as capacity.  
Given this research, it seems natural to conclude that young children are virtually 
immune to any detrimental effects of failure; if failure has no impact on ability, there’s no 
reason for it to be experienced negatively. However, a great deal of research has 
demonstrated that although young children may not have a complete understanding of 
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ability, they can indeed be negatively impacted by failure experiences (Diener & Dweck, 
1980; Heyman, Dweck, & Cain, 1992; Rhodes & Brickman, 2008; Smiley & Dweck, 
1994; Ziegert et al., 2001). For instance, Smiley and Dweck (1994) found individual 
differences in responses to failure experiences in children as young as four and five years 
old. These differences reflected the predicted patterns of maladaptive cognitions, affect, 
and behavior indicative of helplessness.  
Ziegert and colleagues (2001) similarly found evidence of helpless behavior in 
kindergarteners, expanding on previous studies to demonstrate that such patterns 
predicted children’s approach to challenges five years later. In a more recent study, Hicks 
and colleagues (2015) found that, by age three, children recognize that the context of 
performance outcome impacts self-disclosure. That is, children recognize that people are 
relatively more reluctant to disclose failures than successes. This finding illustrates young 
children’s ability to reason about not only achievement situations but also failure 
specifically. Indeed, at three years old these children appeared to recognize that failure is 
something negative that is best kept private.  
Additional research further suggests that young children use and respond to 
achievement information in important ways (Cain, Heyman, & Walker, 1997; Cimpian, 
Arce, Markmen, & Dweck, 2007; Heyman & Compton, 2006; Heyman, Gee, & Giles, 
2003; Hicks, Liu, & Heyman, 2015). Cain and colleagues (1997) found that preschoolers, 
like older children and adults, see past behavior as providing information about likely 
future behavior. In addition, preschoolers generalized information from the sociomoral 
domain to the domains of intelligence and athleticism, suggesting that some children may 
view the information as part of an underlying global concept. This notion is critical given 
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that implicit theories of intelligence apply across domains in a similarly comprehensive 
manner. If preschoolers can recognize the application of a belief across contexts, they are 
likely capable of holding and operating from similar types of beliefs regardless of how 
aware of such beliefs they might be. 
Further, Heyman and her research team (2003) found that preschoolers hold 
systematic beliefs about ability. In particular, preschoolers showed a systematic tendency 
to infer that a child who finds a task to be easy is smarter than a child who finds that task 
to be difficult. Similarly, Heyman and Compton (2006) found that five-year-old children 
are sensitive to subtle contextual cues when making inferences about ability. Specifically, 
the authors’ results indicated that children who were primed to consider the perceived 
difficulty of the task were more likely to view ability as a static quality. These findings 
suggest that children are influenced by implicit cues that are available to them in their 
environment. In this way, shaping young children’s beliefs toward adaptive perspectives 
of intelligence may be much more feasible than previously thought.  
Not only do young children recognize and act on achievement relevant 
information, but they are also capable of producing self-evaluations (Jennings, 2004; 
Kelley, Brownwell, & Campbell, 2000; Lewis, Allesandri, & Sullivan, 1992; Stipek, 
Recchia, & McClintic, 1990). Stipek and her research team (1990) as well as Lewis and 
colleagues (1992) demonstrated that children as young as three years old are capable of 
engaging in self evaluative judgments and experiencing pride and shame relative to 
success and failure on a task. Jennings (2004) further showed that by age two and a half, 
the large majority of toddlers display pride at least occasionally upon completing a task. 
The ability to self evaluate is especially critical for the research questions at play in the 
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current study. Indeed, if children can actively think about themselves in critical ways, 
then the helpless and mastery patterns displayed in older children could also be evident in 
younger children. 
 A final thought regarding developmental considerations is in regard to the 
measurement process. With young children, it is especially critical that the 
operationalization of the relevant constructs is appropriate for the age group involved. 
For example, Stipek and MacIver (1989) noted that the verbal assessment methods used 
in research with young children could restrict children’s ability to articulate distinctions 
between concepts. Cain et al. (1997) expressed similar concerns, highlighting the 
importance of including salient pieces of behavioral information, concrete tasks, and 
reducing memory and verbal production demands. Many researchers have expressed 
concern with achievement motivation measures in general (Murphy & Alexander, 2000; 
Pintrich, Conley, & Kempler, 2003; Wigfield & Cambria, 2010), cautioning the 
comparison of findings that define and operationalize motivational constructs differently. 
 The studies discussed of course do not disprove Nicholls’ (1990) findings 
regarding children’s developmental restrictions, but instead provide an additional 
important perspective to consider. Young children are undeniably limited in their 
capacity to articulate themselves and understand abstract concepts, however research 
clearly demonstrates that young children notice and respond to achievement information 
in systematic ways. However implicit the message and manifestation of such information 
may be, young learners are significantly impacted by the feedback they receive. 
Moreover, it is critical for educators and parents to consider the kinds of implicit 
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information they communicate to children and for researchers to conduct careful, 
thorough research with young learners. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The overall question that guides the current study is: Do implicit theories of 
intelligence begin to develop in early childhood? If children do hold implicit beliefs 
about intelligence, they may convey such beliefs through the way in which they think, 
feel, and behave in response to failure and challenge. It is hypothesized that patterns 
indicative of the mastery and helpless responses in relation to implicit theories of 
intelligence will be evident even in children three and half to four years of age. To that 
end, there are two sets of research questions. 
First, how do children respond to experience with failure (i.e., insoluble puzzles)? 
Embedded within this question are three sub questions: a) What type of puzzles will 
children choose after experiencing failure? b) What will children state as reasons for their 
puzzle choice? c) Will children’s choice and reason for choice be in agreement?  
Responses to failure experience are expected to differ across children. 
Specifically, the types of puzzles that children choose following failure are expected to 
reflect their self-conceptions of ability, spontaneous verbalizations, performance, 
emotion, and future expectancies for success. For example, a child who verbalizes 
performance concern, shows a decline in on task performance, lower ratings of emotion, 
or negative expectancies for future success is expected to choose soluble puzzles post 
failure. However, children who express strategic verbalizations, maintain on task 
performance, report higher emotions and positive expectancies for success are expected 
to choose insoluble puzzles. In addition, the reasons that children provide for their puzzle 
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choices are expected to differ and are expected to be in agreement with the puzzles they 
choose to rework. For example, children who choose to rework soluble puzzles are 
expected to explain their choice through a No Challenge or Want/Like reason and not a 
Challenge response. Children who choose to rework insoluble puzzles are contrastingly 
expected to provide a Challenge or Want/Like reason and not a No Challenge explanation 
for their puzzle choice.  
Second, does effort- or ability-related feedback impact the way three and a half to 
four year old children approach challenge? It is expected that more of the children 
avoiding challenge (i.e., choosing soluble puzzles and providing No Challenge reasons) 
will have received ability, rather than effort, feedback. In essence, children in this no 
challenge group are expected to reflect an entity theory of intelligence through their focus 
on performance and ability as well as their helpless-like response to failure. 
In contrast, children who more often approach challenge (i.e., choose insoluble puzzles 
and give Challenge reasons) are expected to be in the effort feedback condition. Children 
in this challenge approach group are anticipated to reflect an incremental theory of 
intelligence through a focus on learning and effort and their mastery response to failure.  
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CHAPTER II  
Method 
Participants 
Thirty children from a mid-sized mid-western city participated in this study. 
Participants were predominantly White (87%), age 3 ½ - 4 years old (M = 45 months). 
Family income ranged from 25,000-30,000 to more than 125,000, with an average 
income of 75,000-80,000. Twenty-one boys (70%) and 9 girls (30%) participated in this 
study. 
Children were recruited from a larger study conducted at a large mid-western 
university. Participants became eligible upon completion of this larger study and were 
recruited via phone. Demographic data as well as cognitive assessment scores were 
obtained from existing data collected in this larger study. Data collection for the present 
study took place between November of 2014 and March of 2015. 
Procedures 
The data collection procedures in this study were adapted from Smiley and 
Dweck (1994), with minor changes made due to the younger age of the participants. 
Changes included reducing the number of faces on the emotion scale from five to three, 
phrasing all questions in terms of the current context (e.g., how do you feel right now 
versus how did you feel when you were working on that puzzle). In addition, a feedback 
condition was included that was not involved in Smiley and Dweck’s (1994) study. Half 
of the children in the sample were randomly selected to receive ability related feedback 
(“you are really good at puzzles”) and the other half of the children received effort 
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feedback (“you worked really hard on that puzzle”). See Table 6 for details regarding 
these measures. 
Data collection occurred at a child’s home in a quiet and comfortable location 
(e.g., the living room). Testing sessions ranged from nine to fourteen minutes.  Each test 
session was audio recorded. Materials included five eight-piece puzzles, a three-point 
emotion scale (happy, middle, sad), a stopwatch, and a testing sheet. 
First, children were trained on the emotion scale using hypothetical situations for 
happy (e.g., “let’s pretend you have a big ice cream cone right now, how would you feel 
if you had a big ice cream cone?”) and sad (“let’s pretend your favorite toy got lost, how 
would you feel if your favorite toy got lost?”). Children’s understanding of each end of 
the emotion scale was recorded. Before starting the puzzles, children’s self evaluations of 
puzzle solving ability was also assessed (“are you good at puzzles or not so good at 
puzzles?”). 
Next, children worked on a total of seven puzzles. First, children worked on a 
soluble puzzle until completion. Then, children worked on three insoluble puzzles for one 
minute each. Puzzles were made insoluble by replacing two of the correct puzzle pieces 
with two different puzzle pieces with similar stimuli (e.g., a different dog and horse or 
different trucks). Children then worked another soluble puzzle until completion. The 
solution times for the initial soluble puzzle and the last soluble puzzle were recorded. In 
addition, after completing these two soluble puzzles, children received one of two 
feedback conditions (“you’re really good at puzzles” or “you worked really hard on that 
puzzle”). Following each insoluble puzzle, children’s expectancies for future success 
were assessed by asking, “If you could work on this puzzle all day, do you think you 
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could finish it?” Before and after each puzzle, children were asked how to indicate how 
they felt at that moment on the emotion scale (happy, middle, sad). After the last soluble 
puzzle, children were again asked if they thought they were good or not so good at 
puzzles. The order of these five puzzles was randomized.  
Children were then instructed to choose two puzzles to do again (“let’s do another 
puzzle, this time you get to pick, which one would you like to do again?”). For these 
puzzles, the correct pieces were restored for the insoluble puzzles in the event that the 
child chose those puzzles, as these last two puzzles were worked on through completion. 
Following their puzzle choice, children were asked why they chose that puzzle. Puzzle 
choices and reasons were recorded on the testing sheet.  
Children’s puzzle choices were coded into two categories: soluble or insoluble. 
Children’s reasons for their puzzle choices were coded into four possible categories: 
challenge (positive interest in trying to solve the puzzle), no challenge (referring to ease 
of the task), want/like (desire or preference for particular puzzle), and no reason 
(claiming I don’t know or not responding at all). See Table 3 for specific examples of 
these categories.  
Recordings of test sessions were transcribed for each child and utterances were 
coded into eight possible categories: performance concern (concern with adequate 
performance), negative self-evaluation (lacking skills or knowledge required), disengaged 
(expressions of withdrawal or suggestions of another task), strategy (deliberate, positive 
task engagement), task appropriate solution (remarks normally accompanying a search or 
fit of pieces), task appropriate difficulty (indicating difficulty of puzzle), task irrelevant 
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(unrelated to puzzle task), ambiguous (sentence fragments unable to be understood or 
coded). See Table 5 for specific examples of these categories. 
Measures 
Child based. Children’s affect was measured using the 3-point face scale 
including happy, middle, and sad. Self evaluation of ability was measured by asking the 
child “are you good or not so good at puzzles?” and expectancies for future success were 
assessed by asking, “If you could work on this puzzle all day, do you think you could 
finish?” 
Task based. The difference between solution times with the first and last soluble 
puzzles was used as a measure of performance decline following failure experience. On-
task performance was measured by the number of pieces the child inserted correctly for 
each insoluble puzzle. The time to complete the first puzzle was used as a measure of 
puzzle solving ability. 
Analytical Approach 
The majority of the measures that were administered based on Smiley and 
Dweck’s (1994) study were not used in analyses because responses were fairly uniform 
across participants. Such measures included children’s puzzle solving ability, child affect, 
on-task performance, performance decline, and self-evaluation of ability. Due to the fact 
that differences among these data were negligible, they were not included in any analyses 
and are not discussed in the results. Rather, the primary information relevant for the 
current analyses are puzzle choices, reasons for puzzle choice, feedback, spontaneous 
verbalizations, and expectancies for success. 
 21
The intention for the current study was to replicate analyses conducted by Smiley 
and Dweck (1994) with a younger sample of children. In the Smiley and Dweck (1994) 
study, children were first grouped into learning and performance groups according to 
their puzzle choices and reasons. This step was completed in the current study; however, 
the learning group only consisted of two children and the performance group consisted of 
only six children. So, the groups did not have enough children to conduct statistical tests.  
Means, standard deviations, and frequencies were calculated and compared for all 
variables. In addition, chi square tests were conducted in order to investigate the study 
hypotheses. Specifically, chi square tests for independence were employed to compare 
the frequency of children’s puzzle choice and reasons for puzzle choice. In addition, chi 
square tests for independence were conducted to determine whether children’s puzzle 
choices and the feedback they received were independent.  
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CHAPTER III 
Results 
For the first research question (how do three to four year old children respond to 
experience with failure?), individual differences were found in the puzzles that children 
chose following failure. Specifically, the  majority of the children chose to rework 
soluble puzzles (60% of first puzzle choice, 57% of second choice) and gave Want/Like 
reasons (40% of first choice, 33% of second) for doing so.  
In addition, frequencies of children’s spontaneous verbalizations indicated that 
verbalizations during failure were reflected in their puzzle choice following failure. As 
presented in Table 5, of the children who produced verbalizations expressing 
performance concern (50%), the majority of them (73%) chose to rework soluble, rather 
than insoluble, puzzles. This same pattern was found for the children who expressed 
negative self evaluation (33%) and disengagement (23%), where 60% of the negatively 
self-evaluating children and 71% of the disengaged children chose to rework soluble, 
rather than insoluble, puzzles. Unexpectedly, 60% of the children who produced 
verbalizations indicative of strategy (67%) also chose to rework soluble puzzles more 
often than insoluble ones. 
Children’s self-conceptions of ability, emotion ratings, and performance decline 
were largely uniform across participants. That is, children primarily expressed high 
confidence in their puzzle solving ability, rated their emotion as happy, and demonstrated 
consistent on-task performance. Only six (20%) children showed any performance 
decline, and majority of these children chose one of each type of puzzle (soluble and 
insoluble) to work on. Twelve children (40%) showed an increase in task performance 
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across insoluble puzzles, but again mostly chose to work on one of each kind of puzzle. 
Only 13 children reported emotions other than happy (i.e., middle or sad) and were 
evenly split in the puzzles they chose to work on. All but two children (one before 
puzzles and one after) indicated that they were good at puzzles, demonstrating an overall 
high evaluation of puzzle solving ability.  
Of the two children who indicated that they did not think they were good at 
puzzles, both of these children provided No Challenge explanations for their puzzle 
choices on both occasions. Children’s expectancies for future success were also primarily 
uniform across children, with most children indicating positive expectations for 
successfully completing insoluble puzzles in the future. However, of the eight children 
who did indicate a negative expectancy for future success on insoluble puzzles, the 
majority of them (75%) chose to rework soluble puzzles following failure. 
Children’s responses to failure were examined in terms of how they would 
explain their puzzle choices and whether or not their choices and explanations would be 
in agreement. Overall, children primarily provided Want/Like reasons (53%) for their 
puzzle choices. The second most common category for reasons offered was No Challenge 
(17-20%), followed by No Reason (7-10%) and Challenge (7%). As expected, children 
displaying an approach to challenge (i.e., choosing insoluble puzzles and giving 
Challenge reasons for choices) preferred to rework insoluble puzzles and those seeking to 
avoid challenge (i.e., choosing soluble puzzles and providing No Challenge reasons) 
more often chose to rework soluble puzzles.  
As shown in Table 7, for children’s first and second puzzle choices, only one 
child provided an explanation inconsistent with his puzzle choice (i.e., insoluble puzzle 
 24
with no challenge reason). Although only two children provided reasons indicating an 
approach to challenge, both of these children chose to rework insoluble puzzles. Five 
children during the first puzzle choice and six children during the second gave 
explanations reflecting an aim to avoid challenge, with all but one choosing to rework 
soluble puzzles. Chi square tests for independence were conducted to test this comparison 
statistically, however results were insignificant for both the first (X2 3, N = 30 = 5.54, p = 
.136) and second (X2 1, N = 30 = 5.25, p = .154) puzzle choice and corresponding reason. 
 Results for the second research question (whether effort- or ability-related 
feedback would impact three to four year olds’ approach to challenge) showed that most 
of the children who received effort feedback (73%) provided a Want/Like response. 
Children who received ability feedback did not appear to provide any consistent type of 
reason for their puzzle choices. As expected, children who received effort feedback more 
often chose to rework insoluble puzzles than those who received ability feedback.  
As shown in Table 8, children who received effort feedback (N=15) chose to 
rework insoluble puzzles (53%) more than soluble ones. Furthermore, of the children 
who received ability feedback (N=15), more children chose to rework soluble puzzles 
(67%) than insoluble ones. In addition, children who provided Challenge reasons were in 
the effort feedback condition and all but one of the children who gave No Challenge 
explanations for their puzzle choice received ability feedback. Chi square tests for 
independence were conducted to determine whether these findings were statistically 
significant, however results for both the first (X2 1, N = 30 = .556, p = .456) and second 
puzzle choice (X2 1, N = 30 = 1.22, p = .269) were insignificant. It is worth nothing that 
while only two children showed a decline in on task performance, both of these children 
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were in the ability feedback condition. Second, of the eight children who reported 
negative expectancies for future success on insoluble puzzles, five of them (63%) were in 
the ability feedback condition. 
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CHAPTER IV  
Discussion 
This study explored implicit beliefs about intelligence in three to four year old 
children by investigating differences in children’s responses to failure. A pattern 
reflecting Dweck and Leggett’s sociocognitive model of achievement motivation was 
expected to emerge through children’s cognitive, affective, and behavioral responses. The 
results from this study suggest that children’s experiences with failure may be related to 
the way in which they approach challenge as early as three and a half years old. 
Two main patterns emerged from this study in relation to children’s willingness to 
confront challenge following failure. First, children who gave reasons for their puzzle 
choices indicative of confronting challenge (Challenge group) had received effort 
feedback, chose to work on insoluble puzzles, and produced only one verbalization 
indicative of performance concern. The children who provided reasons for their puzzle 
choices indicating avoidance of challenge (No Challenge group) had received ability 
feedback, chose to work on soluble puzzles, and produced more verbalizations reflecting 
performance concern, disengagement, and negative self-evaluation.  
Smiley and Dweck’s (1994) study also found that children who chose to rework 
insoluble puzzles were most likely to provide a Challenge or Want/Like reason, whereas 
children who chose soluble puzzles never provided a Challenge reason and the majority 
offered a No Challenge reason. Although in the current study only two children made up 
the Challenge group and six were in the No Challenge group, it is remarkable that a 
pattern emerged at all from data with such a small sample and with children so young. In 
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fact, there was only one child who demonstrated a pattern inconsistent with the 
hypotheses (i.e., chose to rework insoluble puzzles and provided no challenge reasons). 
The findings from this study are also striking in light of concerns with young 
children’s capability to differentiate between ability and effort (Nicholls, 1990; Nicholls 
& Miller, 1984). The present study showed that overall and as expected, children who 
received ability feedback more often chose to rework soluble puzzles and those who 
received effort feedback more often chose insoluble puzzles. In addition, as anticipated, 
children in the Challenge group all received effort feedback while those in the No 
Challenge group had received ability feedback. Furthermore, the only two children who 
showed a consistent performance decline across failure trials as well as the majority of 
the children with negative expectancies for success had received ability feedback. While 
these findings certainly do not demonstrate children’s understanding of ability as a 
general concept, it does show that children react differently to ability related information 
as early as three and a half years old. 
There are several factors that might explain why these findings were not 
supported by statistical significance (through chi square tests). First, with only 30 
children the sample size is small, making it harder to detect effects from statistical tests. 
In addition, it is more difficult to gather consistent results with young children, which 
could add further potential error. Even given the insignificant results, however, the 
descriptive findings alone suggest that children may be impacted by ability or effort 
information irrespective of whether they are capable of defining such concepts.  
It is noteworthy that the majority of the children in this study chose to rework 
soluble puzzles. Given the general optimism and high levels of confidence typically 
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observed in young children, one might expect most of the children in this sample to have 
no issue approaching challenge (i.e., choosing insoluble puzzles). Even though 93% of 
children reported high confidence in their puzzle solving ability, only 30% consistently 
chose to rework insoluble puzzles. Furthermore, only two of the children who did choose 
insoluble puzzles explained their choice through a Challenge response. This suggests that 
even in early childhood, children appear to choose to avoid challenging experiences. The 
precise reasons why children chose to avoid challenge in this study can only be 
speculated, but it is striking that despite high levels of confidence, so many chose to work 
on puzzles that they knew they could solve. 
Given the age range of the children in the sample, it is not surprising that the most 
common utterance category was Task Irrelevant. It is interesting to note, however, that 
Disengagement was the least common type of utterance produced. One might expect that 
if children are primarily producing utterances categorized as irrelevant to the task at hand, 
they would also then be disengaged. However, when the content of children’s utterances 
is taken into account this finding is less perplexing. The majority of children’s task 
irrelevant utterances were in response to particular stimuli presented on a puzzle piece 
(e.g., “I like dogs”). Moreover, children’s attention and interest was typically directed 
toward the puzzle even if they spoke about elements that were unrelated to actually 
solving the puzzle. 
As expected, children who produced utterances in Performance Concern, 
Negative Self-Evaluation, and Disengagement categories more often chose to rework 
soluble puzzles. This finding is consistent with Smiley and Dweck’s (1994) results, 
where children in the performance goal group produced more Performance Concern, 
 29
Disengaged, and Negative Self-evaluation utterances than children in the learning goal 
group. It is important to note, however, that in the current study soluble puzzles were also 
the most common choice for children who produced strategic verbalizations. In fact, 
children within the No Challenge group produced four times as many strategic utterances 
as those in the Challenge group. This is in stark contrast to Smiley and Dweck’s (1994) 
findings, where no group differences were found for the strategy utterance category. 
This phenomenon could be explained by the fact that children tended to choose 
soluble puzzles in this sample overall. It might also reflect young children’s tendency to 
self-guide throughout problem solving experiences. That is, perhaps those children who 
were more strategic in their verbalizations were also those who became particularly 
frustrated during failure, and consequently verbalized both their distress and approach to 
solving the puzzle. It may be that at this age, children who avoid challenge still employ 
problem-solving techniques in the face of failure. This notion lends further support for 
targeting research in early childhood to preserve such strategic techniques of struggling 
learners.  
Limitations 
The current study is not without limitations. The sample for this study not only is 
small, but also homogenous with regard to ethnicity and income. Majority of the children 
in this sample came from White, middle to upper class families. In addition, information 
regarding children’s experience with puzzles or knowledge about puzzles was not 
collected and therefore it is possible that children who were willing to work on insoluble 
puzzles pursued challenge more often due to prior knowledge or experience. Finally, 
there were several children who potentially realized (during puzzle choices) that there 
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were different pieces available. As a result, these children could have perceived the 
insoluble puzzles as far less of a challenge than those who did not observe the differences 
across pieces. 
Implications and Future Directions 
The current study expands on existing research by demonstrating that children 
might think and react to achievement situations differently already in early childhood. It 
is possible that at this time, children begin to develop beliefs about achievement that then 
form their implicit theories of intelligence. In this way, children may be vulnerable to 
implicit messages about intelligence and achievement before even entering formal 
schooling. For this reason, it is critical to more deeply understand exactly when and how 
such beliefs develop into implicit theories. For instance, is there something about the 
classroom setting that initiates the development of such beliefs, or do beliefs develop first 
at home? If young children do hold some form of implicit theory, when is there a direct 
impact on child outcomes? Do teachers or parents have more of an influence on the 
beliefs that children develop? 
Some research has started to answer these questions, showing that parental 
negative evaluations can influence children’s self-evaluations and emotions (Kelley et al., 
2000) and that the type of praise provided by parents can impact children’s motivational 
framework (Gunderson, Levine, Gripshover, Romero, & Dweck, 2013; Pomerantz & 
Kempner, 2013). It is also known that teachers’ perceptions and expectations can have a 
profound impact on student outcomes (Jussim & Harber, 2005; Ready & Wright, 2010). 
Future research is needed, however, to clarify the impact of parents compared to teachers 
on young children’s perceptions of intelligence and achievement.  
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The current study further provides important information toward more efficiently 
targeted cognitive and motivational interventions. If children begin to develop implicit 
beliefs about intelligence in early childhood, preschool may ultimately be the most 
effective period for interventions to be implemented. Indeed, attribution-retraining 
programs (e.g., Good, Aronson, & Inzlicht, 2003) that aim to encourage incremental 
theories of intelligence could have a more lasting impact if they are administered in early 
childhood.  
Such interventions may be especially effective when conducted with teachers in 
early childhood settings. Indeed, implicit beliefs about intelligence could be 
communicated through the way in which failure is handled in the classroom. It is possible 
that if children observe educators interpreting failure in an opportunistic and constructive 
manner, they could transfer that method of interpretation to their own experiences. Future 
research should explore how this type of teacher-based intervention could improve young 
children’s perception of failure and approach to challenge. 
How children view intelligence does not just affect how they view themselves as 
students, it can affect how they view the educational system as a whole. Through a 
qualitative investigation exploring kindergartners perception of “smartness”, Hatt (2012) 
concluded that some children disengage from school early on because they learn that they 
do not belong in school, and therefore it is not worth investing in. If children are 
undeterred by academic failure and approach challenges with confidence in their ability 
as students, such disengagement from school might be avoided. It could be critical for 
young learners future success as students to perceive failure as an opportunity rather than 
personal inadequacy. Findings from the current study suggest that children may be 
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receptive to achievement related information as early as three and half years old. Further 
exploration into the effects of implicit beliefs in early childhood classrooms is essential to 
the success and well being of young learners. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. 
 
Children’s Age, Income, and General Cognitive Ability Scores 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std Dev 
Age (months) 30 43 51 45.17 2.55 
Income (thousands) 29 25-30 More than 125 85-90 5.18 
GCA Score 30 75 128 105.93 13.59 
*Note: GCA score is from the Differential Ability Scales (DAS) cognitive assessment 
 
 
Table 2. 
 
Distribution of Children’s Sex and Ethnicity 
Sex  
   Male 21 (70%) 
   Female 9 (30%) 
Ethnicity  
   White 27 (90%) 
   Hispanic/White 1 (3.3%) 
   Asian/White 1 (3.3%) 
   Black/White 1 (3.3%) 
 
 
Table 3. 
 
Examples of Children’s Reasons for Puzzle Choices 
 Challenge No Challenge Want/Like No Reason Uncodeable 
Example 
“Because I 
didn’t finish 
it” or  
“It’s hard 
and I want to 
do it” 
“I really 
know how to 
do this one” 
or  
“Because 
it’s easy” 
“I just want 
to”  
or 
“I like 
trucks” 
“I don’t 
know” 
or 
“I just do” 
“It has the 
other pieces” 
or 
“It’s not the 
same horse” 
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Table 4. 
 
Frequencies and Percentages of Children’s Puzzle Choices and Reasons 
 Puzzle Choice #1 Puzzle Choice #2 
Soluble 18 (60%) 17 (57%) 
Insoluble 12 (40%) 13 (43%) 
 Reason #1 Reason #2 
Challenge 2 (7%) 2 (7%) 
No Challenge 5 (17%) 6 (20%) 
Like/Want 16 (53%) 16 (53%) 
No Reason 3 (10%) 2 (7%) 
Uncodeable 4 (13%) 3 (10%) 
 
 
Table 5. 
 
Examples and Frequencies of Children’s Spontaneous Verbalizations during Testing 
Utterance Category Example Total # Utterances # Children who uttered 
Performance Concern 
“That’s not 
a good one 
for me” 
25 15 (50%) 
Negative Self-Evaluation “I can’t do it” 20 10 (33%) 
Disengaged 
“Can I do a 
different 
one?” 
10 7 (23%) 
Strategy 
“Maybe it 
goes in this 
one” 
64 20 (67%) 
Task Appropriate Difficulty 
“I don’t 
know 
where this 
goes” 
75 21 (70%) 
Task Appropriate Solution “That one goes here!” 212 21 (70%) 
Task Irrelevant “I like 
starfish” 325 24 (80%) 
Ambiguous Most often 
non-words 7 4 (13%) 
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Table 6. 
 
Description, Relevance, and Adaptation of Measures 
Measure Construct Operationalization Relevant Findings 
Altered 
from 
Smiley & 
Dweck 
Pretest time Puzzle solving 
ability 
Total time taken to complete 
pretest puzzle  
 
Emotion Children’s affect 3pt scale (happy, middle, 
sad) 
 
 
# puzzle 
pieces 
On task 
performance 
Count of correct puzzle 
pieces inserted during 
insoluble puzzles 
 
 
Solution time 
difference 
Performance 
decline 
The difference between the 
time to finish the post-
failure soluble puzzle and 
his or her time to finish the 
pre-failure soluble puzzle 
 
 
Good/Not so 
good 
Children’s 
assessment of 
their ability 
“Are you good or not so 
good at puzzles?” asked 
before and after failure 
experience 
 
 
Expectancies Task specific 
confidence 
“If you worked on this 
puzzle all day, do you think 
you could finish?” asked 
after each insoluble puzzle 
  
Puzzle choice 
Achievement 
goal orientation 
(in conjunction 
with reasons) 
“We get to do 2 more 
puzzles. Which puzzle 
would you like to do again?” 
asked (twice) following last 
soluble puzzle 
 
 
Reason for 
puzzle choice 
Achievement 
goal orientation 
(in conjunction 
with choices) 
“Why did you pick that 
puzzle to do?” asked 
following each puzzle 
choice 
 
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Table 7. 
 
Comparison of Children’s Puzzle Choices and Reasons  
 Puzzle Choice #1 
Reason #1 Soluble Insoluble 
   Challenge 0 2 (7%) 
   No Challenge 4 (13%) 1 (3%) 
   Want/Like 12 (40%) 4 (13%) 
   No Reason 2 (7%) 1 
   Uncodeable 0 4 (13%) 
 Puzzle Choice #2 
Reason #2   
   Challenge 0 2 (7%) 
   No Challenge 5 (17%) 1 (3%) 
   Want/Like 10 (33%) 5 (17%) 
   No Reason 1 (3%) 2 (7%) 
   Uncodeable 2 (7%) 2 (7%) 
 
 
Table 8. 
 
Comparison of Children’s Puzzle Choices and Reasons according to Feedback Condition 
 Feedback Condition 
Puzzle Choice #1 Effort Ability 
   Soluble 8 (53%) 10 (67%) 
   Insoluble 7 (47%) 5 (33%) 
Reason #1   
   Challenge 2 (13%) 0 
   No Challenge 0 5 (33%) 
   Want/Like 11 (73%) 5 (33%) 
   No Reason 1 (7%) 2 (13%) 
   Uncodeable 1 (7%) 3 (20%) 
Puzzle Choice #2   
   Soluble 7 (47%) 10 (67%) 
   Insoluble 8 (53%) 5 (33%) 
Reason #2   
   Challenge 2 0 
   No Challenge 1 (7%) 5 (33%) 
   Want/Like 9 (56%) 7 47%) 
   No Reason 2 (13%) 1 (7%) 
   Uncodeable 1 (7%) 2 (13%) 
*Note: Percentages are out of N=15 as half the sample received effort feedback and half 
received ability feedback 
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Table 9. 
 
Comparison of Challenge and No Challenge groups with Children’s Utterances 
 Performance 
Concern Disengaged 
Negative Self-
Evaluation Strategy 
Soluble, No 
Challenge 
(N=5) 
3 5 1 17 
Insoluble, 
Challenge 
(N=2) 
1 0 0 4 
 
